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Is There an Anti-Democracy Principle in the
Post- Janus v. AFSCME First Amendment?
Charlotte Garden†

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees, Council 31,1 the Supreme Court held that union-represented public sector workers could not be compelled to pay money to the
union that represents them. However, even as the Court affirmed that
public sector labor-relations systems could remain “exactly as they are”2
as long as they did not mandate union dues or fees, the Court also
hinted in dicta that it might not be finished announcing new First
Amendment principles regarding public sector union arrangements.
Specifically, the five-Justice majority also observed that the exclusive
representation system—in which an elected union represents every employee in a bargaining unit—“substantially restricts the rights of individual employees.”3
This observation was enough to prompt dozens of new lawsuits
challenging exclusive representation in the public sector. These cases,
which have uniformly and rightly failed, differ in their specific legal
theories. But they all target collective bargaining and not other public
sector workplace management systems under the First Amendment.
For example, those who argue that exclusive representation by a labor
union is unconstitutional do not—and presumably would not—argue
that it would be unconstitutional for a public employer to hire a management consulting firm to assist it in determining pay and other benefits for groups of workers. Likewise, if employers simply empowered
an internal human resources department to set wages and working conditions, that department would face few constitutional constraints

†
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1 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). The respondent’s name is frequently shortened to “AFSCME.”
2
Id. at 2485 n.27.
3
Id. at 2460.
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regarding whether or to what extent it permitted employee input into
its decisions.
What is the constitutional objection to collective bargaining with
an exclusive representative? As I explain in Part III, the lawyers bringing these cases imply that the answer lies either in the fact that collective bargaining representatives are elected by employees themselves, or
that unions commit themselves to representing the interests of workers,
rather than management. If that is right, then there is a central irony
at the crux of these cases: plaintiffs often couch their arguments in
terms of rights to speech and association, but success could imply that
workers have a constitutional right not to more democratic participation in their workplaces, but instead to have their wages and working
conditions determined unilaterally by their employers.
This Article explores the current wave of First Amendment challenges to the exclusive representation system and other aspects of public sector labor relations, arguing that these systems are constitutional
as a matter of both law and of logic. Part II begins with an overview of
the relevant Supreme Court case law, which mainly dates to the 1970s
and 1980s. It then discusses the Court’s more recent cases holding that
public employees cannot be compelled to pay union fees as a condition
of keeping their jobs—these cases do not concern exclusive representation, but their existence helps to explain why some union opponents
have chosen now to attempt to unsettle the constitutionality of exclusive representation. Part III analyzes some of the arguments common
to the new round of challenges to exclusive representation. This section
focuses first on the arguments that collective bargaining displaces a
right to bargain individually with a public employer, or creates the appearance that represented workers support their union, arguing that
neither premise is accurate. It then turns to the argument that unions
are engaged in state action when they set membership requirements or
determine internal decision-making criteria. This argument—which
the Article argues is unfounded—is the predicate to a set of arguments
that unions cannot exclude nonmembers from their own internal deliberations, leadership, or benefits.
II. THE CHALLENGE TO EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATION
A. The First Challenges to Exclusive Representation
Public-sector collective bargaining became widespread in the
United States in the 1960s and 1970s.4 Both then and today, virtually

4

SETH D. HARRIS ET AL., MODERN LABOR LAW IN THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS 64–65
(2d ed. 2016).
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all jurisdictions that permit public sector collective bargaining use what
is known as the exclusive representation system, in which an elected
union is charged with representing every worker in the bargaining
unit.5 In turn, the union owes each represented worker what is known
as the duty of fair representation, which requires the union to treat
workers fairly and not to discriminate based on workers’ individual
characteristics such as race, gender, or union membership.6
The rapid growth of public sector unionization was followed by litigation, including several cases challenging aspects of public sector collective bargaining under the First Amendment. This section recounts
and analyzes those cases. The bottom line is that the Court mostly affirmed that governments were free to decide to handle labor relations
with their public sector workforces through collective bargaining with
an elected exclusive representative. The main exception, in which the
Court imposed limits on states’ choices, involves union dues and fees.
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,7 the Court limited how unions
could finance certain expenses, but it did not question the constitutionality of the underlying logic or structure of bargaining.
This subsection considers the relevant cases chronologically. Collectively, they establish that workers have a right to associate with a
labor union even in the absence of a collective bargaining statute,8 but
also a right to criticize publicly union proposals or the collective bargaining process.9 On the other hand, states also have considerable flexibility: they may adopt the exclusive representation system without
even implicating employees’ First Amendment rights,10 bar rival unions
from accessing channels of communication reserved for the exclusive
representative,11 or refuse to permit union participation in any or all
aspects of workplace governance.12 Finally, in the now-overruled Abood
v. Detroit Board of Education,13 the Court limited how unions could finance activities other than collective bargaining, though it agreed that
governments and unions could jointly require represented workers to
pay for their share of union representation.

5

See Clyde W. Summers, Exclusive Representation: A Comparative Inquiry Into a “Unique”
American Principle, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 47 (1998).
6
For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between the exclusive representation system and the duty of fair representation, see Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 169, 206–07 (2015).
7
431 U.S. 209 (1977).
8
Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463 (1979).
9
City of Madison v. Wis. Emp’t. Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
10
Minnesota State Bd. of Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 274 (1984) (“Knight II ”).
11
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
12
Smith, 441 U.S. at 463–64.
13
431 U.S. 209 (1977), overruled by Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
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The first of these cases, Madison v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, arose after a union-represented teacher spoke at a
school board meeting in opposition to certain union bargaining proposals, including that represented teachers be required to pay agency
fees. In an administrative complaint, the union alleged that “the board
had engaged in negotiations with a member of the bargaining unit other
than the exclusive collective-bargaining representative,” thereby violating a provision of state law forbidding city employers from striking individual employment contracts with union-represented employees.14
The Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission agreed that the
school board had committed an unfair labor practice, and ordered that
it “immediately cease and desist from permitting employees, other than
representatives of Madison Teachers, Inc., to appear and speak at meetings of the Board of Education, on matters subject to collective bargaining between it and Madison Teachers Inc.”15 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the Commission’s decision, writing that “[t]he principle
of exclusivity, by definition, forbids certain individuals from speaking
certain things in certain contexts . . . . But the gravity of that evil was
considered outweighed by the necessity to avoid the dangers attendant
upon relative chaos in labor-management relations.”16
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, citing earlier cases holding that
public employees did not “relinquish the First Amendment rights they
would otherwise enjoy as citizens.”17 Then, the Court distinguished
speaking at a school board meeting—something that any citizen of Madison was free to do—with true union negotiations.18 “Whatever its duties as an employer, when the board sits in public meetings to conduct
public business and hear the views of citizens, it may not be required to
discriminate between speakers on the basis of their employment, or the
content of their speech.”19 Likewise, the Court observed that teachers
who objected to union representation could express their views in other
available fora, such as the news media.20
The key here is the Court’s focus on where the relevant speech occurred—at a public-school board meeting—and whether union-represented teachers were disadvantaged as compared to other citizens. In a
14

City of Madison, 429 U.S. at 172, 173 n.4.
Id. at 172–73.
16
City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wisc. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 231 N.W.2d 206,
212–13 (1975), rev’d and remanded sub nom. City of Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wisc. Emp’t
Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
17
City of Madison, 429 U.S. at 175 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968)).
18
Id.
19
Id. at 176.
20
Id. at 176 n.10.
15
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concurrence joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan emphasized
this point, writing that public employers could hold “closed bargaining
sessions” in which only union representatives could be heard.21
Next, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the Court held that
union-represented public employees could not be required to contribute
toward the cost of a union’s activities outside of its role as bargaining
representative.22 A large number of scholarly articles discuss Abood and
cases that rely on it, and I will not retread their discussions of Abood’s
holding or consequences. For purposes of this Article, I want to make
only two points about Abood and the exclusive representation system.
First, the decision treated the fact of exclusive representation as a reason that mandatory union agency fees were justifiable,23 as part of what
Cynthia Estlund has called labor law’s “quid-pro-quo.”24 But, as Estlund
also describes, under this view, it is the exclusive representation system
(coupled with the duty of fair representation, which prohibits unions
from discriminating against represented nonmembers) that offers one
basis for agency fees, not the other way around.25 In other words, even
though agency fees help the exclusive representation system function
well, Abood did not suggest that agency fees are a prerequisite to the
constitutionality of exclusive representation.
Second, the Abood Court addressed an argument that bears more
directly on one iteration of the current day challenges to exclusive representation. The Court noted that “[t]he appellants’ complaints also alleged that the Union carries on various ‘social activities’ which are not
open to nonmembers.”26 The Court made this observation in the course
of discussing an issue it ultimately left for another day—which union
activities fell into the category of expenses that were germane to its role
as representative, and were therefore chargeable. But with the allegation left undeveloped, the Court simply noted that “[i]t is unclear to
what extent such activities fall outside the Union’s duties as exclusive
representative or involve constitutionally protected rights of association.27 The Court did not say whose rights of association were at issue,
21

Id. at 178.
431 U.S. at 236 (discussing “drawing lines between collective-bargaining activities, for
which contributions may be compelled, and ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining,
for which such compulsion is prohibited”).
23
Id. at 221–22 (“The designation of a union as exclusive representative carries with it great
responsibilities . . . . A union-shop arrangement has been though to distribute fairly the cost of
these activities among those who benefit . . . .”).
24
Estlund, supra note 6, at 206.
25
Id. at 217–218 (describing the “free rider” problem that would result from a system in which
unions are required to fairly represent each worker in a bargaining unit, but foreclosed from requiring them to pay their share).
26
Abood, 431 U.S. at 236 n.33.
27
Id. (emphasis added).
22
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but it would have been logical for the Court to think that a union, as a
private association, had a First Amendment right to refuse to associate
socially with represented nonmembers.28
Next, the Court addressed whether the First Amendment required
public employers to allow a role for public sector unions in workplace
governance. In Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local
1315,29 the Court rejected a union’s argument that it violated the First
Amendment for the State Highway Commission to refuse to “consider a
grievance unless the employee submits his written complaint directly
to the designated employer representative.”30 While observing that the
Commission’s rule would be inconsistent with labor statutes applicable
in other jurisdictions, the Court held that it did not violate—or even
implicate—the First Amendment. “[T]he First Amendment does not impose any affirmative obligation on the government to listen, to respond
to, or in this context, to recognize the [union] and bargain with it.”31
However, in the course of ruling against the union, the Court also
wrote that the Commission did not “prohibit[] its employees from joining together in a union, or from persuading others to do so, or from advocating any particular ideas.” If it had, the Court continued, it would
give rise to a “claim of retaliation or discrimination proscribed by the
First Amendment.”32 This language suggests that public sector employers may not refuse to hire or otherwise retaliate against public employees based on their union membership. Likewise, it suggests that, at a
minimum, unions and public employees have the right to advocate on
workplace issues in whatever fora are available to them, even though
public employers are not required to open channels that are otherwise
closed for communication.
The Court again dealt with the relationship between closed channels of communication and union representation in Perry Education
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n.33 There, a rival union challenged
a provision in a collective bargaining agreement that required the district to allow its teachers’ elected exclusive representative access to the
in-school mail delivery system, while denying access to competing unions.34

28

Other cases confirm this right to exclude. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647–
48 (2000) (discussing contours of this right).
29
441 U.S. 463 (1979).
30
Id. Arkansas demanded that employees themselves handle the potentially stressful process
of submitting a grievance, instead of allowing the union to take that step. Id.
31
Id. at 465.
32
Id.
33
460 U.S. 37 (1983).
34
Id. at 40–41.
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This time, the Court found that the rival union’s First Amendment
rights were implicated by the differential access policy,35 but then
turned to the characteristics of the mailboxes themselves. The Court
held that the mailboxes were a “nonpublic forum,” which meant that
the school could “reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable
and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials
oppose the speaker’s view.”36 Viewing the case through the lens of stateas-property-owner,37 the Court held that as long as the district did not
convert the mailboxes to a designated public forum by allowing indiscriminate access for the public, the school district was free to privilege
an exclusive representative’s access over a rival union’s. And while a
state’s discretion to exclude would-be speakers from a nonpublic forum
does not extend to viewpoint discrimination, the Court held that the
exclusion was viewpoint neutral; this conclusion was buttressed by the
fact that the employees, not the school, were charged with choosing the
exclusive representative that would in turn receive mailbox access. At
the same time, the Court observed that “exclusion of the rival union
may reasonably be considered a means of insuring labor peace within
the schools,” and deterring “inter-union squabbles.”38
Perry Education Association is different than some of the other
cases discussed in this section because it involved state control over one
channel of communication between a union and teachers, rather than
communication between the union and the state itself. In Smith and
Madison, the Court grappled with when the state, itself an unwilling
audience, was free to close its metaphorical ears to an unwanted message. Perry more directly involved listeners’ rights in addition to speakers’ rights—some teachers may have liked to hear from the Local Educators’ Association, while others would have tossed its missives in the
trash.
A closely related concern prompted a dissent by four justices who
would have held that the mailbox restriction was viewpoint discriminatory.39 But the dissenting justices focused on the Perry Education Association’s likely reason for wanting to exclude the Local Education Association,40 raising the question of whether or when it is appropriate to
35

Id. at 44 (“There is no question that constitutional interests are implicated by denying
PLEA use of the interschool mail system.”).
36
Id. at 46.
37
Id. (“[T]he State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
38
Id. at 52.
39
Id. at 65.
40
Id. (“On a practical level, the only reason for the petition to seek an exclusive access policy
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impute the reasoning of the union—a private organization that by definition cannot violate the First Amendment—to the school district.
The last case in the series discussed in this Section is also the one
that deals with exclusive representation most directly. Minnesota State
Board for Community Colleges v. Knight 41 involved a challenge by a
public employee to a “meet and confer” statute that required the state
to discuss topics that fell outside of the state’s collective bargaining process with its employees’ union or (if there was no union) other representative.42 Inversely, the statute prohibited state employers from either negotiating or conferring with employees individually or with other
representatives.43 The plaintiffs in Knight were state university employees who wanted their own seat at the bargaining table and in the
“meet and confer” process.44
Knight made two trips to the Supreme Court. In the first, the Court
summarily affirmed a decision of a three-judge district court that it was
lawful for the state to exclude parties other than elected union representatives from collective bargaining.45 In the second, the Court upheld
Minnesota’s meet-and-confer statute in an opinion that focused on public employers’ rights to control which parties may participate in nonpublic forums.46
The plaintiffs in Knight objected to the fact that the statute also
restricted public employers from either bargaining or conferring with
represented employees except through their elected representative—
that is, the suit challenged the state’s decision to create a channel of
communication to which only an elected representative would have access.47 On the other hand, the state did not limit what represented public employees could say in public settings or private settings to which
they could gain access; for example, they were free to criticize employer
or union positions on topics of collective bargaining or collective conferencing in any available forum.48

is to deny its rivals access to an effective channel of communication.”).
41
465 U.S. 271 (1984).
42
Id. at 274. Unlike the state’s separate collective bargaining law, the meet-and-confer statute
did not require the state to bargain in good faith over covered topics. Rather, the statute created a
channel for employees to provide input through their chosen representatives. Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 278.
45
Knight v. Minn. Cmty. Coll. Faculty Ass’n, 460 U.S. 1048 (1983) (“Knight I ”).
46
Knight II, 465 U.S. at 280.
47
Id. at 275.
48
Id. (noting that “nothing in PELRA restricts the right of any public employee to speak on
any ‘matter related to the conditions or compensation of public employment or their betterment’
as long as doing so ‘is not designed to and does not interfere” with the exclusive representative’s
rights or duties).
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The Knight II Court upheld the collective conferencing statute, ultimately writing that the plaintiffs’ argument was less compelling than
the (also unsuccessful) challenge in Perry Education Association.49 The
difference was that, whereas Perry Education Association involved a
claim of access to a nonpublic forum, the Knight plaintiffs “claim[ed] an
entitlement to a government audience for their views.”50 The Court emphasized that government bodies are free to decide whom to consult,
and that the decision to solicit “outside” advice from one voice does not
create an obligation to listen to competing outside views.51 The alternative, the Court continued, could create an unworkable morass for both
policymaking parts of government and for the courts, because “[g]overnment makes so many policy decisions affecting so many people that it
would likely grind to a halt were policymaking constrained by constitutional requirements on whose voices must be heard.”52 Thus, the Court’s
conclusion rested on two premises. First, that as a doctrinal and theoretical matter, the First Amendment does not guarantee a government
audience—there is no such thing as a First Amendment right to participate in private deliberations of government. And second, that as a practical matter, “the government could not work” if the First Amendment
required it to listen to either nobody or everybody.53
Finally, the Court also rejected two arguments that—as Part III
discusses—also appear in the new set of challenges to exclusive representation. First, the fact that the Faculty Association did not choose the
plaintiffs—individuals who objected to the Association’s positions—to
represent it in its deliberations with the state “no more unconstitutionally inhibits [plaintiffs’] speech than voters’ power to reject a candidate
for office inhibits the candidate’s speech.”54 And second, the meet-andconfer statute did not violate the plaintiffs’ associational rights, even
though its functioning meant that they “may well feel some pressure to
join the exclusive representative” in order to participate in its advocacy.55
Knight II was not unanimous—Justices Brennan, Stevens, and
Powell dissented, with Justices Brennan and Stevens writing separate
opinions. Justice Brennan saw the case through the lens of academic
freedom, and he objected to the faculty’s choice either to join the Faculty
49

Id. at 281.
Id. at 282.
51
Id. at 284–85.
52
Id. at 285.
53
See generally Nikolas Bowie, The Government-Could-Not-Work Doctrine, 105 VA. L. REV. 1
(2019) (discussing cases in which the Court has reasoned that its outcome is necessary to the government’s ability to function).
54
Knight II, 465 U.S. at 289.
55
Id. at 289–90.
50
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Association, or be excluded from meet-and-confer sessions.56 It is unclear whether he would have dissented from a similar majority opinion
involving non-academic workers, or even public school teachers who
worked in a K-12 setting. Justice Brennan also emphasized that his objection did not extend to collective bargaining settings, because of “the
state’s compelling interest in reaching an enforceable agreement, an interest that is best served when the state is free to reserve closed bargaining sessions to the designated representative of a union selected by
public employees.”57
Justice Stevens’s dissent, which Justices Brennan and Powell each
joined in part, reasoned that “the First Amendment does not permit any
state legislature to grant a single favored speaker an effective monopoly
on the opportunity to petition the government.”58 Thus, Justice Stevens
would have required the state to satisfy strict scrutiny before excluding
the plaintiffs from the meet-and-confer process. However, he also noted
that collective bargaining was different, citing Abood.59
Knight II settled things for almost 30 years. As the next section
discusses, in 2012, the Supreme Court’s conservative-leaning justices
suggested they were open to new arguments regarding public sector labor relations. That suggestion arose in a case that, like Janus, was focused on union dues and fees. But union opponents soon began to push
against other aspects of public-sector labor relations, including the exclusive representation system. Outside of the agency fee context, these
arguments have gotten nearly no traction, although they have been percolating in dozens of cases.
B. New Challenges to Exclusive Representation
In 2012, the Supreme Court held in Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 100060 that union-represented public workers
who were not union members had to affirmatively consent before they
could be charged a mid-year fees increase.61 I have criticized Knox in
detail elsewhere,62 but its main significance for this Article was as a
triggering mechanism. By signaling that the Court was open to expanding the rights of union-represented nonmembers,63 Knox prompted a
new round of exclusive representation challenges.
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Id. at 295–96 (discussing “the free exchange of ideas at institutions of higher learning”).
Id. at 299.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 315–16.
567 U.S. 298 (2012).
Id. at 321.
See, e.g., Charlotte Garden, Meta Rights, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 855 (2014).
Knox, 567 U.S. at 311 (referring to Abood as an “anomaly”). But perhaps more importantly,
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One of those challenges became the Supreme Court’s next major
decision concerning public sector unions, Harris v. Quinn.64 The Harris
Court held that union-represented “partial-” or “quasi-” public employees could not be required to pay agency fees to their elected union representative.65 In the District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the case focused on this issue, in addition
to procedural and justiciability issues that are not relevant to this Article.66 However, the Seventh Circuit issued its decision in 2011, and the
Supreme Court did not grant certiorari in the case until 2013—shortly
after the Court’s decision in Knox.
In the Supreme Court, the Harris plaintiffs sought to raise the constitutionality of exclusive representation alongside their agency fee arguments. For example, they wrote in their opening brief that “requir[ing] providers to accept [an elected union] as their ‘exclusive
representative’ . . . infringes on their associational rights, as it inextricably affiliates them with the Union’s petitioning, speech, and policy
positions.”67 This argument proceeded in two steps. First, the plaintiffs
argued that their First Amendment rights were implicated because a
mandatory agency relationship links union-represented workers to the
union’s speech. Then—echoing both the Knight plaintiffs and Justice
Stevens’s dissent in that case—the Harris plaintiffs argued that the
State was required to satisfy strict scrutiny in order to justify infringing
associational rights, but that “[t]he State has no interest in suppressing
providers’ ability to petition it through diverse associations.”68 Here, the
Harris plaintiffs analogized collective bargaining to lobbying, arguing
that “the expressive activity is identical.”69
The argument seemed to get off to a rocky start for the Harris plaintiffs, with Justice Scalia asking a series of skeptical-sounding questions
about whether public sector employees really had a First Amendment
right to demand that their employers listen to them:
Knox gave the petitioners more relief than they requested, signaling that union objectors should
make more ambitious requests of the Court. For a more detailed accounting of the litigation in
Knox, see Garden, supra note 62 at 876–77.
64
573 U.S. 616 (2014).
65
Id. at 656. “Partial” or “quasi” public employees are those who are jointly employed by a
government and a private individual or organization; for example, the plaintiffs in Harris were
home healthcare providers who were paid by the state but directed in their day-to-day work by
individual customers.
66
See Harris v. Quinn, No. 10-cv-02477, 2010 WL 4736500, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2010),
aff’d in part, remanded in part, 656 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 573 U.S. 616 (2014), and rev’d in part sub nom, Harris v. Rauner, 601 F. App’x 452 (7th
Cir. 2015) (listing issues presented in the case); Harris v. Quinn, 656 F.3d 692, 693–94 (7th Cir.
2011) (same).
67
Brief for Petitioners at 37, Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 (2014) (No. 11-681).
68
Id. at 39.
69
Id. at 41 (emphasis in original).
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Suppose you have a policeman who . . . is dissatisfied with his
wages. So he makes an appointment with the . . . police commissioner, and he goes in and grouses about his wages. He does this
. . . 10 or 11 times. And the commissioner finally is fed up, and
he tells his secretary, I don’t . . . want to see this man again. Has
he violated the Constitution?70
Counsel for Harris replied, “No, because . . . with an individual speaking, it’s . . . a matter of private or internal proprietary matter that, under this Court’s precedents, [doesn’t] rise to a matter of public concern.”71 Later, Justice Sotomayor asked whether there was “anything
wrong with the State saying, ‘we’re not going to negotiate with any employee who’s not a member of the union?’”72 Harris’s counsel answered
“no,” and he later elaborated that “[u]nder Knight, the State can choose
who it bargains with.”73
Perhaps because of that exchange, the Harris Court did not ultimately discuss the briefed exclusive representation argument at all, instead stating that “Petitioners do not contend that they have a First
Amendment right to form a rival union. Nor do they challenge the authority of the [elected union] to serve as the exclusive representative of
all of the personal assistants.”74
The Court’s next (and most recent) case about public sector unions
is Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31.75 Janus overruled Abood, holding that public sector
employers and unions could not require represented workers to pay an
agency fee as a condition of employment. As in Knox and Harris, Justice
Alito wrote for the majority. Of significance for this Article, the majority
opinion assumed the existence of exclusive representation, asserting repeatedly that unions would continue to serve as exclusive representatives for groups of employees even without agency fees.76 Further, the
majority wrote that—aside from having to discontinue mandatory
agency fees—“[s]tates can keep their labor-relations systems exactly as
they are.”77 Given that the Janus opinion spent considerable time discussing exclusive representation, this statement suggests that the majority did not see that aspect of labor relations systems as legally problematic.
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 (2014) (No. 11-681).
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Harris, 573 U.S. at 649.
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
See, e.g., id. at 2480, 2483.
Id. at 2486 n.27.
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On the other hand, the majority also sent two contradictory signals.
First, the opinion stated that exclusive representation “substantially
restricts the rights of individual employees,” because “this designation
means that individual employees may not be represented by any agent
other than the designated union; nor may individual employees negotiate directly with their employer.”78 Later, it characterized exclusive representation as “a significant impingement on associational freedoms
that would not be tolerated in other contexts”79—a statement that is
reminiscent of the Knox majority’s characterization of Abood as “something of an anomaly—one that we have found to be justified by the interest in furthering ‘labor peace.’ But . . . an anomaly nonetheless.”80
However, the Janus majority did not elaborate on either of these statements, and it did not cite Knight II or other cases on associational freedoms—in fact, Knight II is not cited a single time in Janus.
Knox, Harris, and Janus offer at least a tentative signal to union
objectors and opponents that the Court’s conservative majority is open
to arguments that various aspects of public sector labor relations violate
the First Amendment. Unsurprisingly, this has led to a large number
of new cases arguing that exclusive representation is unconstitutional.
The next subsection discusses the main arguments in those cases. To
be clear, these arguments have rightly received a chilly reception in the
federal courts so far—but the same was true of cases arguing that
Abood should not be applied to home healthcare workers, or should be
overturned, until conservative Supreme Court majorities in Harris and
Janus adopted those positions. Thus, the remainder of this Article offers an analysis of, and conceptual rejoinder to, those arguments.
III. ASSESSING THE NEW ARGUMENTS ABOUT EXCLUSIVE
REPRESENTATION
There are dozens of post-Knox cases that challenge aspects of exclusive representation in the public sector.81 Rather than attempting to
catalogue each of them, this section discusses a handful of representative cases, focusing on two lines of argument in particular.82 The first
78

Id. at 2460.
Id. at 2478.
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Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 311 (2012).
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This Article focuses on First Amendment challenges, but some cases also raise other arguments, such as an argument that exclusive representation violates federal antitrust law. See, e.g.,
Crockett v. NEA-Alaska, 376 F. Supp. 3d 996, 1009–10 (D. Alaska 2019) (describing and rejecting
an antitrust argument).
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These cases also vary in terms of the workers involved. Some follow the Harris Court’s
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clients. See, e.g., Bierman v. Dayton, 900 F.3d 570 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2043
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line insists that the First Amendment is violated when a public employer designates a union as representative for an employee, because
doing so puts the union’s words in the employee’s mouth. These arguments focus mainly on the relationship between the union and the employer, but fail to make a legal and factual case that the link between a
union and a represented worker counts as compelled association, or its
appearance. Second, other cases argue that union membership incentives or other practical constraints on workers’ choices about union
membership violate the First Amendment. These cases argue that exclusive representation requires unions to grant represented nonmembers all the same rights and benefits that usually come with union
membership, including rights to participate in union governance. This
argument faces the opposite difficulty from the first set—it links the
union and its members, but excludes the government, meaning that the
state action necessary to trigger constitutional protection is not present.
A. Exclusive Representation as Compelled Speech or Association?
Uradnik v. Inter Faculty Organization83 is representative of the
first set of arguments. In a petition for a writ of certiorari that the Supreme Court denied in April 2019, the petitioner echoed the Harris
plaintiffs in arguing that the problem with exclusive representation is
that it requires “compelled representation” of public sector workers,84
and that it results in workers being “forced to accept [a union’s] speech,
made on their behalf by a state-appointed representative, as their
own.”85
The petitioner in Uradnik was a professor employed by a public
university in Minnesota. Uradnik challenged the Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations Act86—the same statute that was at issue in
Knight87—although she focused on the collective bargaining provision
that had been summarily approved by the Supreme Court in Knight I
rather that the meet-and-confer provision that was discussed in greater
detail in Knight II.

(2019) (exclusive representation challenge involving home healthcare providers). In the next Section, I note a few instances in which plaintiffs develop arguments that the First Amendment analysis should turn on their partial public employee status.
83
No.18-1895, 2018 WL 4654751 (D. Minn. Sept. 27, 2018), summarily aff’d, No. 18-3086 (8th
Cir. Dec. 3, 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1618 (2019).
84 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Uradnik v. Inter Faculty Org., 139 S. Ct. 1618 (2019)
(No. 18-719) https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-719/74002/20181204095722857_U
SSC%20Petition%20for%20Writ%20of%20Certiorari.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GE5-8G8N].
85
Id. at 2–3.
86
MINN. STAT. § 179A.06–08 (2019).
87
Id. at 10.
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Uradnik’s petition began by attempting to distinguish Knight, arguing that although Knight upheld a state’s ability to exclude persons
from a meet-and-confer session, it had not approved “compelled representation,” because the plaintiffs had focused only on the former and
not the latter. The main problem with this system, according to
Uradnik, was that Minnesota law treated an elected union as the “representative” of all employees in a bargaining unit, whether or not each
employee actually agreed with the union’s positions.88 Or, as Uradnik
put it, “when the Union speaks, it is speaking for the Petitioner, putting
words in her mouth.”89 This representation, Uradnik reasoned, violated
the Court’s precedents about compelled speech and compelled association because exclusive representation could not be justified by any sufficiently compelling interest, nor was it narrowly tailored to any such
potential interest.90
Each iteration of this argument is premised on the idea that exclusive representation either actually compels or restricts public employees’ speech or association, or that it creates the false appearance of
speech or association by, for example, causing third parties to believe
the employee is a union supporter. But that premise is flawed as both a
matter of case law and of logic. A union’s relationship to represented
workers is more like a voter’s relationship to an elected government
than it is to a lawyer’s relationship to a client. No reasonable observer
would attribute a government’s views to each voter—of course, the voter
might have preferred different representatives. In the same way, no
reasonable observer would assume that every union-represented
worker supports the union’s positions.
Many courts have correctly relied on Knight II to conclude that exclusive representation does not involve actual compelled speech or association.91 The key is that unions may not require represented workers
to join them, nor may they bar represented workers from joining other
organizations. Likewise, unions cannot compel represented workers to
tow the metaphorical line during negotiations, or to walk the literal
picket line during a strike. As the Knight II Court put it, exclusive representation “in no way restrained appellees’ . . . freedom to associate or
not to associate with whom they please, including the exclusive
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Id. at 14 (citing MINN. STAT. § 179A).
Id.
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Id. at 16–17.
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See, e.g., Mentele v. Inslee, 916 F.3d 783, 788–89 (9th Cir. 2019); Bierman v. Dayton, 900
F.3d 570 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2043 (2019); Hill v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 850
F.3d 861, 866 (7th Cir. 2017); Jarvis v. Cuomo, 660 F. App’x 72, 74 (2d Cir. 2016); D’Agostino v.
Baker, 812 F.3d 240, 244 (1st Cir. 2016); Thompson v. Marietta Educ. Ass’n, 371 F. Supp. 3d 431
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representative.”92 That much is underscored by the Court’s holding in
Madison v. WERC that a union-represented employee had the same
freedom as any other citizen (or as any other public employee) to express her views in any available forum, including views that her employer should reject union bargaining proposals.93
Even beyond the fact that union representation does not limit represented workers’ rights to join other organizations or express themselves in opposition to the union, there are also multiple senses in which
union representation enhances—rather than detracts from—opportunities for workers to make themselves heard, even if they are union opponents. First, there is the fact that unions are elected (and can later be
rejected) through a democratic process, and if a union is elected then
collective bargaining replaces other methods by which employers impose wages and working conditions, which are often unilateral and autocratic.94 Second, as a practical matter, union representation tends to
lead to working conditions that are conducive to employee speech. For
example, union-represented workers tend to earn a wage premium, and
union contracts often contain provisions related to job security, seniority, scheduling, and other matters that make work more predictable and
less precarious.95 Perhaps most important, collective bargaining agreements usually limit the grounds on which an employee can be fired, and
include a disciplinary process. These conditions usually aren’t a formal
“right to speak out,” but they are speech-enhancing. For example, predictable schedules make it easier for workers to plan to attend government town-halls and other fora, campaign for a preferred candidate,
and otherwise participate in civic life.96 And protections against arbitrary termination can help workers feel confident that they won’t be
retaliated against at work if they take an unpopular position, either in
the public square, or in water-cooler conversation with co-workers.
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Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 288 (1984).
429 U.S. at 174–75.
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See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR LIVES (AND
WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT IT) 57 (2017) (discussing scope of employer power over wages and
working conditions).
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See Benjamin I. Sachs, Agency Fees and the First Amendment, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1046, 1067
(2018) (discussing the union wage premium in the context of represented workers’ First Amendment rights); see also Estlund, supra note 6, at 218 (observing that if a union represented employee
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Does collective bargaining displace a right to individual bargaining?

Opponents of exclusive representation sometimes frame their challenge in a way that suggests that union representation means objectors
are losing the right to negotiate on their own behalf. For example, the
employee plaintiffs in Branch v. Commonwealth Employment Relations
Board,97 discussed further in the next subsection, wrote that “the government . . . extinguishes the Educators’ right to represent themselves
with their employers.”98 Similarly, the challengers in another recent
case, Bierman v. Dayton, “allege[d] that [exclusive representation] violates their First Amendment right to choose who speaks for them in
their relations with the State.”99
If public employees truly had a legal right to negotiate with their
employer, then it would follow that electing an exclusive representative
extinguished an opportunity for speech that public employees would
otherwise have had. But recent Supreme Court cases have rejected that
premise.100 For example, in Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri,101 the
Court held that the First Amendment right to petition—like the First
Amendment right to free speech—does not protect a public employee’s
complaints and requests of their employer unless those complaints or
requests are about a matter of public concern.102 And in Connick v. Myers,103 the Court made clear that most workplace problems—including
those related to “confidence and trust . . . in various supervisors, the
level of office morale, and the need for a grievance committee”104—do
not rise to the level of matters of public concern.
Further, there are no signs that the Court is likely to shift on this
point. To the contrary, Justice Alito—the author of the majority opinions in Knox, Harris, and Janus—emphasized during oral argument
that public employees have no First Amendment right to seek better
treatment from their supervisors: “I suppose that [a public sector

97

Branch v. Dep’t of Labor Relations, Commonwealth Emp’t Relations Bd., 120 N.E.3d 1163
(Mass. 2019), cert. denied 140 S. Ct. 858 (2020).
98
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Branch v. Dep’t of Labor Relations, Commonwealth
Emp’t Relations Bd., 140 S. Ct. 858 (2020) (No. 19-51).
99
Appellants’ Brief at *I, Bierman v. Dayton, 900 F.3d 570 (8th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-1244).
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To be clear, I am not suggesting that it would be constitutionally impermissible for a public
employer to negotiate with an individual employee, or that public employers never voluntarily
negotiate with individual employees or job applicants. My point is simply that the alternative to a
system of exclusive representation is not necessarily one in which individual employees negotiate
with their employers.
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564 U.S. 379 (2011).
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461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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Id. at 148.

94

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2020

employer] has a perfect right to say: Enough is enough; I don’t want to
meet with you for the fifth time or for the first time.”105 Then, in Janus,
the Court majority took care to avoid calling into question Guarnieri,
Connick, and other cases concerning the limited First Amendment
rights of individual public employees. Instead, the Court wrote that
while it is a matter of only private concern when a single employee requests a raise, “a public-sector union’s demand for a 5% raise for many
thousands of employees it represents” would qualify as a public concern
because of the potential budgetary effects, were the employer to agree
to such a demand.106 As a result, public employers would not violate the
First Amendment if they decided to ignore or even punish employees
attempting to use workplace channels to negotiate on their own behalves.107
2.

Does exclusive representation create an appearance of union
support?

Even if exclusive representation does not restrict speech or association, it might still implicate the First Amendment if it creates the false
appearance that represented workers were union supporters.108 For example, the plaintiffs in Harris argued that the fact that an exclusive
representative union owed them the duty of fair representation was
enough to “affiliate[] them with the Union’s petitioning, speech, and policy positions.”109 In their reply brief, the plaintiffs similarly argued that
Illinois had “dictate[d] . . . who shall speak for every provider by designating an exclusive representative to petition for them . . . thrust[ing]
providers into a fiduciary relationship with” the union.110 The lynchpin
of that argument seems to be the “fiduciary relationship” between a
105

Supra note 70, at 10 (emphasis added).
Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2472–73. (2018). The correctness of the
Court’s approach is beyond the scope of this Article, but I have critiqued it elsewhere. See Charlotte
Garden, Speech Inequality after Janus v. AFSCME, 95 IND. L.J. 269, 288–89 (2020).
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Many states that allow public sector collective bargaining also protect by statute the ability
of union-represented workers to raise grievances directly with their employers. For example, Massachusetts law states that an “employee may present a grievance to his employer and have such
grievance heard without intervention by the exclusive representative,” though the public employer
cannot resolve the grievance in a way that is inconsistent with an applicable collective bargaining
agreement. MASS. G.L. c. 150E § 5.
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See Seana V. Shiffrin, What is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 NW U. L. REV.
839, 851–52 (discussing First Amendment “rulings [that] protect individuals from having to attest
to beliefs that they reject and thus from having others wrongly associate them with those beliefs”).
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Brief for Petitioners at 37, Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 (2014) (No. 11-681),
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union and represented workers, which the Harris plaintiffs argued was
enough to “inextricably affiliate[] them with the union’s petitioning and
policy positions.”111 The petitioner in Uradnik made a similar argument, focused on statutory language referring to an elected union as the
“representative” of employees in the bargaining unit, and reasoning
that a “representative” speaks for the person they represent.112
In other words, the argument is: if a union can truthfully say it is
a worker’s “representative,” then others would assume that the union’s
positions are also the positions of the represented worker. But that argument relies on a specific version of “representation,” similar to that
undertaken by lawyers or hired spokespeople. But elected representatives also “represent” their constituents—though they do not speak for
them. Only the first type of “representative” can reasonably be regarded
as speaking for those they represent—for example, judges and opposing
counsel will attribute an attorney’s statements to their client, and a client whose attorney makes an admission or concedes a point during oral
argument cannot usually take a different position later. Instead, their
remedy is usually to assert in a later court proceeding or a bar complaint that the attorney breached their duty as the client’s representative.
If union representation worked like attorney representation, then
it would make sense to argue that the union’s speech put words in the
mouths of represented workers. But union representation is crucially
different. First, recall that neither private- nor public-sector unions
may compel represented workers to join the union as a condition of
keeping their job, and in the public sector (as well as in states with
“right-to-work” laws), unions also cannot compel represented nonmembers to pay anything towards the costs of the costs of union representation. And, while unions have a duty of fair representation to all represented workers, their performance of their duty is evaluated according
to a flexible standard that recognizes that some represented workers
may flatly disagree with some or all union decisions.113 This disagreement can be both forceful and public—for example, the union’s brief opposing certiorari in Uradnik cited evidence reflecting Uradnik’s frequent and public opposition to the union’s positions.114
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(No. 18-719).
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Further, unions negotiate collective bargaining agreements in their
own names; workers are third-party beneficiaries rather than parties.115 This means that although workers benefit from union-negotiated collective bargaining agreements, they cannot be bound by the union to honor its provisions. For example, a union that calls a strike in
violation of a no-strike clause can be enjoined116—but an employer cannot successfully sue striking employees for breach of contract, even if
they are covered by a collective bargaining agreement that contains a
no-strike clause.117 In contrast, a lawyer who negotiates a contract is
typically doing so on behalf of a client, who will then become a party
with obligations that can be enforced by the other party.
These differences make attorney representation a poor analogy for
union representation. Instead, as the First Circuit observed in the
course of rejecting a challenge to exclusive representation, “once [a union] becomes the exclusive bargaining agent for a bargaining unit, [it]
must represent the unit as an entity . . . solely for the purposes of collective bargaining.”118 This makes representation by an elected official
a closer analogy. Voters are entitled to vote for or against a candidate,
but they will be stuck with the results of the election unless they move
out of the jurisdiction. The winning candidate will then have significant
(but not unlimited) latitude to implement their policy preferences; there
is no legally enforceable duty of fair representation, but elected officials
generally may not discriminate or retaliate against their opponents’
supporters.119
Given these rules, it would be irrational to think that everyone who
lives in a jurisdiction supports their elected officials—inevitably, some

139 S. Ct. 1618 (2019) (No. 18-719), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-719/93384/2
0190327130415676_18-719_bio_Inter_Faculty_Organization.3.27.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A9KACJ8] (“Petitioner’s disagreements with the IFO and its views are well known on campus.”).
115
See Clyde W. Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE L.J. 525,
538–39 (1969) (“Professor Corbin treats collective agreements as contracts made for the benefit of
third persons, and quite properly so. The union and the employer clearly intend to provide benefits
for the individual employees, and the individual employees acquire legally enforceable rights under the agreement.”).
116
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 254–55 (1970).
117
See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 408–09 (1981) (holding that the employer was not entitled to recover damages from employees who engaged in strike that was in
violation of a contractual no-strike clause); United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 951
v. Mulder, 31 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 1994) (discussing ability of employees to sue—but not be
sued—as third party beneficiaries to a collective bargaining agreement).
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Reisman v. Associated Faculties of the Univ. of Me., 939 F.3d 409 (1st Cir. 2019) (emphasis
in original).
119
See, e.g., O’Hare Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 714–15 (1996) (“Although
the government has broad discretion in formulating its contracting policies, we hold that the protections of Elrod and Branti extend to an instance . . . where government retaliates against a contractor, or a regular provider of services, for the exercise of rights of political association or the
expression of political allegiance.”).

77]

IS THERE AN ANTI-DEMOCRACY PRINCIPLE POST- JANUS?

97

voters would have preferred different candidates. In the same way, it
would be irrational to assume that an elected union that owes a duty of
fair representation to each worker in a bargaining unit is in fact taking
positions that each worker prefers. Rather, the union is each worker’s
representative in the political sense—it is the representative chosen in
a likely contested election, and it is bound to advocate for its view of
what workplace conditions will advance workers’ interests within the
confines of the duty of fair representation.
3.

Do union elections trigger First Amendment scrutiny where
autocratic alternatives do not?

Finally, there is also a more intuitive reason to reject the argument
that exclusive representation either restricts speech or association or
creates the appearance of such a restriction. Consider a non-union public employer facing new budget constraints that compel cuts. The employer might choose to hire a management consultant to give advice
about issues such as whether it would be better to make layoffs or cut
benefits. The consultant—either at the employer’s request or on its own
initiative—might then ask workers about their views and preferences,
and take those views into account when making its recommendations.
In turn, the employer could give negligible or decisive weight to the employees’ views as reported by the consultant.
In much the same way, another public employer that faces a significant amount of workplace turnover might ask a human-resources professional to conduct a series of focus-group-style interviews with current workers. Based on what the employees say in these meetings, the
human resources professional might make recommendations about
what to do, for example that the employer should improve pay, add a
tuition benefit, or change the promotion process.
Do these scenarios give rise to a First Amendment problem? If the
Uradnik and Harris plaintiffs are right about exclusive representation,
then the answer should be yes: both hypothetical employers have asked
others to aggregate and then make representations about employees’
preferences. These employers have also declined to allow employees either to opt out of this process, or to form their own competing advisory
groups. However, that argument seems obviously wrong under the case
law discussed in Part I, and as a matter of logic.
There are two differences on which objector employees would likely
rely to distinguish her arguments from the one in the previous paragraph. First, during collective bargaining, the employer is committed to
bargain over union proposals, rather than to take the consultant’s or
the employees’ recommendations into account to whatever degree it
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chooses.120 But that difference places us squarely back in Knight II territory, by focusing on the employer’s own choice about how to engage
with an employee representative. Second, there is the fact that a union
is elected by employees themselves, and then it owes those employees a
duty of fair representation. That is the difference on which the Harris
and Uradnik plaintiffs focused—implying that, from their perspective,
a First Amendment problem arises only when a public employer does
not behave autocratically enough, instead allowing workers to elect a
bargaining representative. We might then recharacterize the First
Amendment arguments in these cases as seeking a right for public employees to have their wages and working conditions set unilaterally by
their employers.
These arguments should fail, but if they were to succeed, some
plaintiffs might hope that public employers respond by allowing multiple bargaining representatives to sit at the table. First, this approach
would likely serve to empower employers rather than employees.121 And
employers could also respond in at least two other ways. First, they
could decide that bargaining with one or more unions on a membersonly basis is too complicated, and respond by eliminating collective bargaining altogether. Second, they could bargain with an elected union on
a members-only basis. But this scenario would not mean that public
employers would permit other employee representatives or individual
employees to bargain for different working conditions. Far more likely,
employers would find it expedient to unilaterally extend collectivelybargained-for working conditions to cover non-members.122 This
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See Electromation, Inc., 309 NLRB 990 *10–11 (1992) (distinguishing “bilateral” negotiation from other ways that management might solicit input from employees in context of deciding
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outcome would leave objectors with less security in their working conditions by depriving them of a contractual guarantee, while also giving
them fewer opportunities to exercise voice at work. In other words, both
the formal structure of this argument against exclusive representation,
and its likely effect if it is accepted by courts, tends to undermine their
proponents’ abilities to have input over workplace conditions.
This section has argued that exclusive representation neither compels public employees’ speech or association, nor creates the appearance
of compulsion. The next section turns to an argument that does not argue directly that exclusive representation is unconstitutional, but instead challenges union membership incentives or restrictions, on the
theory that they influence public employees’ choices about whether or
not to become union members.
B. State Action in Worker-Union Relations?
This set of arguments focuses on the relationship between unions
and represented workers. It is exemplified by the petition for certiorari
filed in Branch v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board.123 The
Branch employees focused on the advantages of union membership over
represented nonmember status, arguing that unions used the services
and benefits offered as a condition of membership to coerce membership.124 The Branch plaintiffs focused on the fact that represented nonmembers could not participate in union democracy, such as voting for
union leadership, voting on certain decisions that the union put to its
membership, and participating in internal union deliberations over topics like negotiation strategies.125 Employees in another case, Bain v.
California Teachers Ass’n, made a similar argument, but focused in part
on union membership incentives such as insurance benefits for which
only union members were eligible.126
These arguments depend on the success of two linked claims: first,
that a public sector union’s relationship with represented workers involves state action, even when the union is not interacting with the government employer but instead setting the terms on which workers may
join; and second, that unions in this posture violate the First Amendment when they constrain represented workers’ choices by excluding
from a bargaining unit for other reasons, such as that they are designated “management and confidential” employees.
123
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Branch v. Dep’t of Labor Relations, Commonwealth
Emp’t Relations Bd., 140 S. Ct. 858 (2020) (No. 19-51), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF
/19/19-51/107367/20190708132424467_Branch%2019-__PetitionForAWritOfCertiorari.pdf [perm
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them from union participation rights or other benefits if they do not join
the union.
The Branch plaintiffs made two arguments on this point. First,
that “[i]f an organization can engage in a specific activity only by government empowerment, then that activity . . . must be one committed
by the government.”127 And second, that the state government “grants
monopoly representation power to the union,” while making “‘direct
dealing’ between government employers and individual employees unlawful.”128 The Branch plaintiffs also argued that Knight should control
the state action question. They reasoned that because Knight assumed
that there was state action when a public employer excluded organizations other than an elected union from its meet-and-confer process,
state action would also be present when “employees seek a voice and a
vote in the collective bargaining process,” including the pre- or postbargaining stage in which the union consults with its members about
bargaining positions. In addition, they argued that the union is “entwined” with the public employer because state law sets the parameters
of the state-union relationship, and that the union is a state actor because it performs functions that have traditionally been performed exclusively by government.
The Bain plaintiffs made a somewhat different argument about
why a union’s decision to offer a membership incentive involved state
action. They posited that “unions intentionally decline to bargain with
school districts for certain critical job benefits that are within their
state-conferred exclusive authority to bargain, and which (if bargained)
would apply to all teachers.”129 In other words, the argument is premised on the allegation that the Bain plaintiffs’ union conspired with the
state to leave “gettable” benefits on the bargaining table so that the union could instead offer those benefits as a membership incentive.
The state action inquiry is a famously flexible one, and it is beyond
the scope of this Article to analyze each line of doctrine that the plaintiffs invoke in various cases. Instead, this Article is limited to two more
conceptual points. First, the argument that public sector unions are
state actors is in tension with Harris and Janus. Second, unions’ adversarial role in public systems of collective bargaining makes them less
likely to qualify as state actors, not more; in this way, public sector unions are analogous to public defenders, who are treated as state actors
only when they directly cause courts to act.
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In Harris, the majority emphasized that the union was a private
organization, likening it to trade groups that “advocate on behalf of the
interests of persons falling within an occupational group,” and asking
why only unions were empowered to charge agency fees.130 And when
the Janus Court addressed the argument that unions should be permitted to charge agency fees because they (unlike other voluntary associations) owed a duty of fair representation to non-members, it wrote that
“it is questionable whether the Constitution would permit a public-sector employer to adopt a collective-bargaining agreement that discriminates against nonmembers.”131 By focusing on employers’—not unions’—potential
constitutional
violations,
this
formulation
differentiates and remains silent about a different question—whether
it would be a constitutional violation for a union to suggest that an employer discriminate against nonmembers.
There also is a deeper inconsistency between the decisions in Harris and Janus, and the argument that a public sector union is a state
actor. In Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n,132 the Court held that a
program requiring beef producers to pay a mandatory fee to finance generic beef advertising was constitutional because the advertisements
were attributable to the government.133 This was because, in the Court’s
words, citizens “have no First Amendment right not to fund government
speech.”134 The Johanns Court specifically distinguished Abood—the
then-controlling case on public sector agency fees—on the basis that
Abood concerned “exactions to subsidize speech . . . of an entity other
than the government itself.”135 In other words, Johanns stands for the
proposition that individuals can be charged an assessment that funds
government speech, but not private speech. Applying this rule, either
public sector unions are state actors, and there is no constitutional problem with agency fees—which would mean that Harris and Janus were
wrongly decided; or they are private actors, whose dealings with represented workers do not involve state action as a general rule, although
particular instances of union conduct could still qualify as state action.
Public defenders are a useful comparison. Public defender offices
can be government departments, or they can be private attorneys or
agencies that contract with the government to provide services. But in
either case, they are not generally considered to be state actors, even
though there are limited circumstances under which specific actions by
130
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public defenders might be treated as state action. That was the holding
in Polk County v. Dodson, in which the Court held that even public defenders who were employed directly by the county did not necessarily
act under color of state law just because they were funded by the
state.136 That is in part because they were “not amenable to administrative direction in the same sense as other employees of the State.”137 Instead, public defenders were bound by duties to their clients to exercise
“professional independence” not subject to state control, and typically
in an adversarial posture to other state interests.138
On the other hand, public defenders are treated as state actors
when they exercise government power. Thus, public defenders’ peremptory challenges are treated as state action because those challenges involve “wielding the power to choose a quintessential government
body.”139 Or, to put it another way, by exercising a peremptory challenge, a public defender triggers action by the government body—in
that case, by prompting a judge to excuse a prospective juror. But the
fact that public defenders’ peremptory challenges count as state action
does not convert the other things public defenders do into state action.
Public sector unions are similar: even though state law generally
empowers them to engage in collective bargaining if they are elected as
the exclusive representative of a group of workers, the government cannot direct the positions that unions take in bargaining or grievances, or
the tactics they use to try to convince government employers to agree to
those positions.140 As in the public defender example, this is one reason
that unions are not generally state actors—and in fact, the case for
treating public defenders as state actors is much stronger than the case
for treating public sector unions as state actors, because unions are
never organized as state agencies. In fact, states that allow public sector
collective bargaining often also bar government employers from exercising control over how the unions operate.141
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In contrast, the state-action requirement is satisfied in public-sector agency-fee cases like Harris and Janus because either state law or
a collective bargaining agreement signed by a public employer requires
union-represented employees to pay the fees. The ability to require a
public-sector employer to take that step is equivalent to exercising a
peremptory challenge, compelling a government entity to dismiss a juror. Likewise, in Knight, state action was present when the Minnesota
government enforced its statute foreclosing anyone other than an
elected union from participating in its conferencing process. However,
a union’s decisions about its own membership requirements or internal
decision-making are more like the public defender’s decisions about how
to represent her clients. The public defender and the union may hope
these decisions will ultimately contribute to a favorable government decision on either a set of wages and working conditions or her clients’
lack of criminal culpability, but they do not have the power to compel a
favorable government decision.
Not only would it be inconsistent with unions’ purposes and structures to treat every union decision as occurring under color of state law,
but unions’ own associational rights militate in favor of allowing unions
to set requirements for membership and to exclude those who do not
qualify. As Catherine Fisk and Erwin Chemerinsky have detailed, the
Supreme Court has protected a robust right of associations to exclude.142 And while the Court has permitted or required some incursions
on that right to protect dissenting members,143 those incursions have all
come in contexts discussed above—those in which the union is directly
engaged with determining the public employer’s treatment of individual workers. By contrast, unions’ internal deliberations and other internal functions both more squarely implicate the core of unions’ own
associational interests.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has discussed the new generation of challenges related
to union exclusive representation. So far, these challenges have—appropriately—failed to gain a toehold, and therefore they have had few
real-world consequences. But if these challenges ultimately succeed,
they have the potential to significantly disrupt labor relations in the
public sector. Moreover, it is possible that a holding that exclusive representation is unconstitutional in the public sector would translate into
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the private sector, where it could be used by anti-union employers to
undermine union contracts.
At the same time, these cases generally suffer from one or more
major conceptual flaws. Some attempt to limit Knight’s reach—but end
up arguing for a worker-disempowering right not to have a say in setting working conditions. Others recast unions as entities that always
act under color of state law—an argument that must seem incomprehensible to the public employers sitting across the bargaining table. For
these reasons, courts should continue to reject the new challenges to
exclusive representation.

